diff-tour
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted code diffs to generate narration. Maliciously crafted code comments or content within the diff could attempt to influence the agent's behavior or narration output.
- Ingestion points: The orchestrator reads the contents of
diff.txt(a git diff) to cluster topics, and workers read individual hunks to provide narration. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the diff content itself.
- Capability inventory: The agents have access to
subprocess.run(via the helper script) for command execution and theRead/Writetools for file access. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is performed on the diff content before it is processed by the agent reasoning steps.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
bin/difftour.pyexecutesgit,gh, andglabcommands to resolve diff ranges and fetch pull request information. These calls represent a capability tier used for local repository access. - Evidence: The
run_gitandgit_outfunctions inbin/difftour.pyinvoke CLI tools viasubprocess.run. These calls use list-based arguments which mitigate direct shell injection vulnerabilities, but they grant the skill the ability to perform network operations (git fetch) and read repository metadata.
Audit Metadata