ios-simulator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interfaces with xcrun simctl and idb for simulator management and UI automation. The script scripts/ios-sim.mjs uses node:child_process.spawn with shell: false, ensuring that arguments are passed as a discrete array which prevents shell-level command injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the idb toolset from Facebook's official Homebrew tap and PyPI registry. As Facebook is a trusted organization, these resources are handled neutrally in this analysis.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading and acting upon potentially untrusted UI data from within the simulator.
  • Ingestion points: UI element descriptions, labels, and titles are ingested from the simulator via idb ui describe-all in the scripts/ios-sim.mjs file.
  • Boundary markers: The output does not include explicit delimiters or system warnings to the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded in UI text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides significant control over the simulator, including app installation, UI interaction (tapping/typing), and modification of system state (privacy grants, erasing/deleting devices).
  • Sanitization: There is no semantic validation or filtering performed on the UI text data before it is presented to the agent context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 09:14 PM