ios-simulator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interfaces with
xcrun simctlandidbfor simulator management and UI automation. The scriptscripts/ios-sim.mjsusesnode:child_process.spawnwithshell: false, ensuring that arguments are passed as a discrete array which prevents shell-level command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the
idbtoolset from Facebook's official Homebrew tap and PyPI registry. As Facebook is a trusted organization, these resources are handled neutrally in this analysis. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading and acting upon potentially untrusted UI data from within the simulator.
- Ingestion points: UI element descriptions, labels, and titles are ingested from the simulator via
idb ui describe-allin thescripts/ios-sim.mjsfile. - Boundary markers: The output does not include explicit delimiters or system warnings to the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded in UI text.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides significant control over the simulator, including app installation, UI interaction (tapping/typing), and modification of system state (privacy grants, erasing/deleting devices).
- Sanitization: There is no semantic validation or filtering performed on the UI text data before it is presented to the agent context.
Audit Metadata