deepresearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data during its OSINT verification and collection stages.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via browser automation tools specified in Stage 3 (Collection) and Stage 4 (Verification) of
SKILL.mdandsubagents/.cursor/agents/verification-expert.md. - Boundary markers: The methodology mandates a falsify-first approach and includes an explicit
references/ETHICS_GUARDRAILS.mdfile that provides instructions on refusing malicious or problematic requests embedded in external data. - Capability inventory: The skill uses browser automation (screenshots, snapshots) and subagents for hypothesis testing and report generation across multiple files.
- Sanitization: The skill incorporates a robust verification process including a dedicated
qa-gatekeeper.mdsubagent and areferences/QA_CHECKLIST.mdto fact-check findings and verify source credibility before delivery. - [METADATA_POISONING]: Several files in the subagents directory contain significant metadata anomalies.
- Evidence:
subagents/.cursor/agents/README.mdcontains over 50 identical copies of its YAML frontmatter.subagents/.cursor/agents/research-lead.mdcontains three redundant copies of its frontmatter. While not containing malicious instructions, this represents severe metadata redundancy that may unnecessarily consume context tokens or attempt to influence model focus through repetition.
Audit Metadata