autonomous-orchestration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull request bodies and issue comments to drive its orchestration logic, such as identifying linked issues and verifying review artifacts. There are no explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps mentioned for this external content, creating a surface where a malicious user with access to the repository could influence the orchestrator's behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs high-impact operations using the
ghCLI andgit, including merging pull requests (gh pr merge) and managing git worktrees, based on state gathered from external sources. The instructions explicitly direct the agent to skip user confirmation for these actions, reducing human oversight. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
reference/failure-recovery.md, the skill dynamically generates prompts for research workers and executes them viacodex exec. This execution incorporates unverified attempt history and issue comments, which could lead to unintended agent actions if the source data is compromised. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill uses MCP Memory (
mcp__memory__create_entities) to maintain anActiveOrchestrationmarker that survives context compactions and session restarts. This allows the orchestration loop to persist and automatically resume without new user intervention, which could be exploited to maintain long-term autonomous access.
Audit Metadata