feedback-triage

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources such as UAT feedback, bug reports, and support escalations.
  • Ingestion points: Raw feedback content is parsed in Step 1 and used to populate various templates in Step 2 and Step 4.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions potentially embedded within the user feedback.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to create and modify GitHub issues and project board items using the gh CLI (Steps 4 and 5).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested content before it is interpolated into issue bodies and titles, creating a risk that malicious feedback could manipulate the agent's behavior during the triage process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The triage protocol relies on bash script templates for project board management and issue creation.
  • The scripts in Step 0 and Step 5 use environment variables and shell command substitution (e.g., git remote get-url, sed, jq) to derive project metadata.
  • In Step 5, placeholders like [ISSUE_NUMBER], [TYPE], and [PRIORITY] are meant to be filled by the agent and executed in a shell environment. If the agent does not properly escape these values—which are derived from the external feedback—it could lead to command injection within the agent's execution context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 02:44 PM