session-start

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to bypass user confirmation, stating 'Resume orchestration immediately
  • do not wait for user input' and requiring the agent to 'Always operate under autonomous-operation mode.' These instructions attempt to override the agent's safety protocols regarding user oversight.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to automatically execute a local script (scripts/init.sh) and trigger package managers (pnpm install, pip install) when bootstrapping the environment. This represents a risk of executing arbitrary code if the repository contains malicious configuration files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol involves extensive use of shell commands through tools like gh, git, docker-compose, and jq to interact with the system and external services.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that could be manipulated by an attacker to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches GitHub project item details, titles, and Pull Request bodies via the GitHub CLI, and retrieves information from a knowledge graph via mcp__memory.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, run local scripts, and install remote packages.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the data retrieved from GitHub or the memory service before it is used in logic or displayed.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 02:44 PM