session-start
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to bypass user confirmation, stating 'Resume orchestration immediately
- do not wait for user input' and requiring the agent to 'Always operate under autonomous-operation mode.' These instructions attempt to override the agent's safety protocols regarding user oversight.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to automatically execute a local script (
scripts/init.sh) and trigger package managers (pnpm install,pip install) when bootstrapping the environment. This represents a risk of executing arbitrary code if the repository contains malicious configuration files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol involves extensive use of shell commands through tools like
gh,git,docker-compose, andjqto interact with the system and external services. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that could be manipulated by an attacker to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Fetches GitHub project item details, titles, and Pull Request bodies via the GitHub CLI, and retrieves information from a knowledge graph via
mcp__memory. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, run local scripts, and install remote packages.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the data retrieved from GitHub or the memory service before it is used in logic or displayed.
Audit Metadata