worker-dispatch
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a
spawn_worker_processfunction inSKILL.mdthat executes thecodex execcommand with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This explicitly disables all security protections and human-in-the-loop approvals, allowing the spawned agent to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through GitHub issue comments.
- Ingestion points: The
spawn_replacement_workerfunction usesgh apito fetch issue comments containing a specific marker. - Boundary markers: None. The fetched content is interpolated directly into the
construct_worker_prompttemplate without delimiters or safety instructions. - Capability inventory: The spawned worker is granted the
Bashtool and operates without a sandbox, providing a direct execution path for any injected instructions. - Sanitization: The skill performs no filtering or escaping of the external content before processing it as instructions.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The use of the
--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag represents a deliberate privilege escalation by bypassing the platform's default security architecture. This allows the AI agent to perform actions that would otherwise be restricted by the sandbox environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses background shell execution (the
&operator) and PID tracking to manage unsanboxed worker processes, increasing the risk of orphaned processes and uncontrolled system resource usage.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata