skill-find

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow relies on fetching content from arbitrary GitHub repositories identified through web search results. This mechanism allows the agent to download third-party code that has not been vetted for security or authenticity.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses skill_install_github and skill_load to integrate external code into the agent environment. It further encourages executing this unverified code using skill_run if a demo is requested, creating a direct path for remote code execution from untrusted sources.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to identify and run entrypoint scripts such as run.sh or files within a scripts/ directory from the downloaded skill. Executing shell scripts from unknown repositories is a high-risk operation that could lead to full system compromise.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and follows instructions from untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads SKILL.md files and directory structures from arbitrary GitHub repositories found via web_search (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instruction-isolation markers are used to separate untrusted external content from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to skill_install_github, skill_load, and skill_run (SKILL.md), providing a powerful execution environment for potentially malicious payloads.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, verification, or integrity checking of the downloaded content before it is processed or executed.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 01:08 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-find