truefoundry-mcp-servers

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing external data from remote OpenAPI specifications and user-supplied hosted STDIO configurations.
  • Ingestion points: OpenAPI specification URLs and mcpServers JSON configuration objects defined in SKILL.md and references/mcp-yaml-variations.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to show a plain-English summary, a full YAML manifest or diff, and the exact CLI command to be executed, requiring explicit human confirmation before any applying changes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the tfy command-line interface and a local helper script (tfy-api.sh) to perform network operations and update server registry entries.
  • Sanitization: The instructions require verifying that spec URLs are trusted and discourage the use of raw secrets, though the content within the specifications themselves is not automatically sanitized by the skill.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands via the tfy CLI and a local API script to interact with the platform. These capabilities are constrained by safety rules that prohibit destructive operations like DELETE and require confirmation-gated dry-runs before final execution.
  • [CREDENTIALS_SAFE]: The skill implements best practices for secret management by utilizing tfy-secret:// references and per-user placeholders ({{API_KEY}}) instead of hardcoding sensitive data. It also explicitly forbids the agent from revealing or printing real credentials unless requested by the user.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 07:10 AM