agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
agent-browserpackage globally usingnpm i -g agent-browser, which introduces an external dependency from a public registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
agent-browserCLI to perform browser automation tasks, including opening URLs, managing sessions, and capturing screenshots. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
agent-browser skills get core --fullto retrieve and follow instructions dynamically from the installed CLI tool at runtime. This allows the CLI to provide arbitrary instructions to the agent that are not present in the skill's static instructions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to interact with and scrape web pages, which serves as an ingestion point for untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: Browser accessibility tree snapshots obtained through
agent-browser snapshot -iinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified to separate scraped web content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
agent-browserand file system writes for media evidence. - Sanitization: No mention of sanitization or filtering of ingested web data before processing.
Audit Metadata