cua-spaces
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes instructions to download and execute an installation script from the vendor's domain to set up host machines.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://cua.ai/install.sh | sh -s -- -y --select spaces,host --no-onboardingin the host setup section. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill enables the agent to run arbitrary shell commands within managed 'Spaces'.
- Evidence:
space_bashtool for running commands with optional timeouts. - [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions for setting up a host machine involve the use of a macOS LaunchAgent to ensure the
cua-spacesddaemon persists across user sessions. - Evidence: "cua-spacesd runs as a LaunchAgent in the Aqua session."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interacts with external environments by reading command outputs and files, creating a potential surface for instructions embedded in external data to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Output from
space_bash, content of files retrieved viadownload, and results fromcall_toolwithin the Space. - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the tool definitions.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
space_bash), file creation (space_write), file transfer (upload/download), and network sharing (hotspot_start). - Sanitization: Instructions include a requirement to get explicit user acknowledgement before moving sensitive app sessions via
teleport_app.
Audit Metadata