admiralty-system
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from threat actor forum posts and CTI reports as part of its core workflow. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions could be embedded in the analyzed intelligence.
- Ingestion points: Workflow step 1 in
SKILL.mddescribes extracting metadata from external reports, blogs, or claims. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters for untrusted input, though it instructs the agent to extract structured fields which provides inherent compartmentalization.
- Capability inventory: The skill does not define or use any dangerous tools such as shell execution, file system modification, or non-whitelisted network requests.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of input content is mandated before the assessment phase, which is typical for specialized analysis tools.
- [SAFE]: The skill uses defanged URLs (e.g.,
Exploit[.]in,hxxps://...) in its examples and templates. These are standard security industry practices for documenting potentially malicious infrastructure safely and do not constitute malicious obfuscation, hidden links, or command injection attempts.
Audit Metadata