sdlc-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from requirement files (digest, audit, and pm-checklist) to generate design specifications. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in these requirements could influence the agent's output during the technical design phase.
- Ingestion points: External files located in
sdlc/<demand_name>/intake/(specificallydigest-*.md,audit-*.md, andpm-checklist-*.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to disregard potentially malicious commands embedded in the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities (
design.md) and utilizescodegraphandmysqlMCP tools to explore the local environment. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content read from the external intake files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's handoff documentation (
references/trellis-handoff.md) instructs the user or system to execute a local Python script for development gatekeeping. - Evidence: The documentation explicitly describes running
python3 <sdlc-gate 安装目录>/scripts/guard_dev.py <项目根> <需求名>to verify development readiness. This involves shell execution of a script with variable arguments based on the project context.
Audit Metadata