council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user input via
$ARGUMENTSand interpolates it into the instructions for multiple sub-agent personas (e.g., Ada, Aristotle, Socrates) during the council workflow. This lack of sanitization or robust boundary markers allows for potential instruction overrides within the sub-agent contexts.\n- Ingestion points: The workflow inSKILL.md(Workflow Step 2: Round 1 and Step 3: Round 2) reads$ARGUMENTSand passes it to the sub-agent prompts.\n- Boundary markers: The prompt templates inSKILL.md(e.g., the round 1 packet) use simple label-based interpolation (Problem: {problem}) without explicit delimiters or specific instructions to the sub-agents to ignore embedded commands.\n- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful agent orchestration features (e.g.,spawn_agent,oracle, or parallel contexts) to delegate deliberation tasks to independent sub-agents.\n- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the$ARGUMENTSinput is performed before it is presented to the sub-agents.
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