codex
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation instructs the agent to bypass Codex's internal security boundaries by using the
--sandbox danger-full-accessflag in specific execution environments. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of high-risk execution flags such as
--yolo, which executes AI-generated code without a sandbox or human approvals, and--full-auto, which automatically applies file modifications to the workspace. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill identifies the file paths for sensitive authentication and session tokens, specifically
~/.hermes/auth.jsonand~/.codex/auth.json. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of complex shell command strings via the
terminaltool to perform repository management and interact with the coding agent CLI. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface by cloning external, untrusted code repositories and then applying an autonomous agent to that code without proper sanitization.
- Ingestion points: External source code fetched via
git clonefrom user-specified URLs. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not provide delimiters or guidance to ignore instructions embedded within the processed source code.
- Capability inventory: Full command execution via
terminal, file system write access via the coding agent, and network access throughgitandghtools. - Sanitization: Absent; no filtering or validation is performed on the untrusted code before the agent processes it.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the
@openai/codexCLI tool from the official NPM registry.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata