github-pr-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to programmatically extract sensitive credentials from local system files.
- Evidence: The authentication detection script in
SKILL.mdsearches~/.git-credentialsand the.envfile located in the user's home directory ($HOME/.hermes/.env) to harvest theGITHUB_TOKEN. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an automated 'Auto-Fix Loop' that processes untrusted external data and performs sensitive repository actions.
- Ingestion points: CI logs downloaded from GitHub Actions via the
/actions/runs/{run_id}/logsendpoint (referenced inSKILL.mdandreferences/ci-troubleshooting.md). - Boundary markers: None. The agent is instructed to read the raw log content directly to understand errors.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
write_file,patch,git commit, andgit pushto apply fixes derived from the untrusted logs (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: None. There is no validation of the log content before it influences the agent's code modification decisions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses inline Python scripts to process JSON data from shell commands.
- Evidence: Multiple instances in
SKILL.mdandreferences/ci-troubleshooting.mdusepython3 -cto execute dynamically provided code strings for parsing API responses. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using variables derived from git remotes and user input.
- Evidence: The script extracts
OWNERandREPOfromgit remote get-url originusingsedandcut, then interpolates these intocurlcommands and API endpoints.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata