himalaya
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's installation instructions in
SKILL.mdsuggest executing a remote shell script usingcurl -sSL ... | sh. This pattern allows for arbitrary code execution from a source not identified as a trusted vendor, posing a high risk of system compromise. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires access to
~/.config/himalaya/config.toml, which stores sensitive IMAP and SMTP authentication details. Managing this file through an agent increases the risk of credential exposure or unauthorized mailbox access. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (incoming emails) which can be used to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads emails using
himalaya envelope listandhimalaya message readas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to isolate untrusted email content from its instruction set.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to send, move, and delete emails, creating a path for automated actions based on malicious content in an email.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not include any sanitization or validation of the email content before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell piping and heredoc patterns (e.g.,
cat << EOF | himalaya template send) to handle message content. If the email content or headers contain shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata