touchdesigner-mcp

Purpose and capabilities are largely coherent for a TouchDesigner control skill, and the documented MCP traffic stays on localhost. The main risk is supply-chain/install trust: the skill requires a vendor-hosted .tox component with same-org legitimacy but without strong public integrity verification, plus it exposes powerful local code-execution and input-automation features. Overall this is better classified as vulnerable/high-risk rather than malicious.

No direct malicious logic (exfiltration, backdoor, reverse shell, or credential theft) is evident in this script. The primary risk is supply-chain trust: it downloads a twozero.tox artifact from a fixed external URL without checksum/signature verification, meaning a compromised or substituted artifact could introduce malicious behavior when later used by TouchDesigner/Hermes. Strengthen by pinning the expected hash/signature and validating after download before writing/using the artifact.