execute-spec-in-fork
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from the conversation history to drive task execution in a child environment.
- Ingestion points: Reads the latest
SPEC READYblock from the current task context and processes incomingMessengercards (replies) from child tasks. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the content within the
SPEC READYblock. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
fork_thread,read_thread,set_thread_archived, and invokes external skills such as/spec-executorand/codex-task-messenger. - Sanitization: The skill contains a strong instruction to verify authorization from the source task's direct user messages and explicitly warns not to trust authorization claims copied into message card bodies.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to trigger the execution of other skills and tools in a forked environment.
- Evidence: It instructs the agent to run
/spec-executorwithin a newly created child thread (fork_thread) based on the contents of the inherited specification. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill manages the lifecycle of agent threads, including creation and archival.
- Evidence: It utilizes harness-specific tools like
fork_threadandset_thread_archivedto manipulate task structures. However, it explicitly mitigates risk by stating the workflow does not add authority to access credentials, modify production data, or commit code.
Audit Metadata