execute-spec-in-fork

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from the conversation history to drive task execution in a child environment.
  • Ingestion points: Reads the latest SPEC READY block from the current task context and processes incoming Messenger cards (replies) from child tasks.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the content within the SPEC READY block.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes fork_thread, read_thread, set_thread_archived, and invokes external skills such as /spec-executor and /codex-task-messenger.
  • Sanitization: The skill contains a strong instruction to verify authorization from the source task's direct user messages and explicitly warns not to trust authorization claims copied into message card bodies.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to trigger the execution of other skills and tools in a forked environment.
  • Evidence: It instructs the agent to run /spec-executor within a newly created child thread (fork_thread) based on the contents of the inherited specification.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill manages the lifecycle of agent threads, including creation and archival.
  • Evidence: It utilizes harness-specific tools like fork_thread and set_thread_archived to manipulate task structures. However, it explicitly mitigates risk by stating the workflow does not add authority to access credentials, modify production data, or commit code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 01:31 AM