skills/tttpob/skills/ppt-mcp-academic/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ppt-mcp-academic

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external task materials and existing presentation data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests user-provided task materials and reads existing PowerPoint slide content and structure (SKILL.md, Section 1; README.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing these materials.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities to modify the environment via the PowerPoint MCP, including ppt_set_text, ppt_add_shape, ppt_add_table, and ppt_execute_mso (referenced in mcp-recipes.md).\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or escape external content before it is interpolated into slide generation prompts or tool calls.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes JavaScript code templates (unwrapPpt and ppt) in mcp-recipes.md for the agent to use when interacting with the PowerPoint MCP. This facilitates the dynamic construction and execution of tool-calling code at runtime via external interfaces like run_code.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation discusses a workflow for exposing local files via a temporary HTTP server to enable remote access by the PowerPoint host.\n
  • Evidence: Section 9 of mcp-recipes.md outlines the use of a temporary server for image transfers: 'When a temporary HTTP server is genuinely needed, expose only the necessary files...'.\n
  • Risk: While providing guidance to limit exposure, this pattern describes the intentional creation of a network-accessible path to local files, which presents a potential data exposure risk.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages a set of specialized tools (mcp__ppt__ppt_*) to perform file system operations and application-level modifications.\n
  • Evidence: mcp-recipes.md lists tools such as ppt_execute_mso, ppt_add_picture_from_url, and ppt_update_shape which are used to execute commands and modify the persistent state of the user's presentations. The use of ppt_execute_mso specifically allows for the execution of arbitrary internal PowerPoint commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 04:08 PM