autogrind
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses forceful directives in
SKILL.mdsuch as "The Iron Law: GRIND UNTIL EXPLICIT STOP SIGNAL" and "NEVER stop on your own" to override the agent's default decision-making regarding task completion. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: In
SKILL.md, the instruction "Operations that would normally require human confirmation are off-limits during autonomous operation" explicitly attempts to suppress platform safety prompts and user oversight (Human-in-the-loop controls). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the ingestion of project files like
CLAUDE.md,.cursorrules, andREADME.md. - Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,GEMINI.md,.cursorrules,opencode.md, andREADME.mdduring the INIT phase. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to isolate external content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Broad command execution, file system access, and git operations during the "Work" phase.
- Sanitization: Absent; no validation or filtering is performed on the content of ingested files before they influence the agent's planning and execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the execution of system commands in
SKILL.md(e.g.,git log,git status,sleep 60) and arbitrary shell operations during the "Work" phase to complete user-defined tasks.
Audit Metadata