autogrind

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses forceful directives in SKILL.md such as "The Iron Law: GRIND UNTIL EXPLICIT STOP SIGNAL" and "NEVER stop on your own" to override the agent's default decision-making regarding task completion.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: In SKILL.md, the instruction "Operations that would normally require human confirmation are off-limits during autonomous operation" explicitly attempts to suppress platform safety prompts and user oversight (Human-in-the-loop controls).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the ingestion of project files like CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, and README.md.
  • Ingestion points: Reads CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules, opencode.md, and README.md during the INIT phase.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to isolate external content from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Broad command execution, file system access, and git operations during the "Work" phase.
  • Sanitization: Absent; no validation or filtering is performed on the content of ingested files before they influence the agent's planning and execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the execution of system commands in SKILL.md (e.g., git log, git status, sleep 60) and arbitrary shell operations during the "Work" phase to complete user-defined tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 07:23 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — autogrind