skills/tumf/conflux/cflx-resolve/Gen Agent Trust Hub

cflx-resolve

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains multiple instructions designed to bypass the agent's standard interaction and confirmation protocols. Phrases like 'CRITICAL
  • This skill CANNOT ask questions or request user input', 'All decisions must be made autonomously', and 'Never: Ask user for clarification' are used to force the agent to act without human review, even when facing ambiguous situations or destructive operations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various git commands, including git checkout, git merge, git commit, and git rm -rf. While expected for conflict resolution, the use of targeted deletion (git rm -rf) combined with the suppression of user confirmation increases the risk of unintended data loss if the agent's logic is flawed or manipulated.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface by instructing the agent to read an external file (openspec/CONSTITUTION.md) and treat it as 'higher-priority project law'. This effectively allows the contents of a file (which may be under the control of a third-party contributor in a PR context) to override the agent's instructions and project logic.
  • Ingestion points: Reads openspec/CONSTITUTION.md and openspec/changes/<change_id>/proposal.md during execution.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to distinguish between data and potential malicious commands within these files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to perform git operations, commit changes, and delete specific directories via git rm -rf.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the content of the 'project law' file before the agent adopts its instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 05:37 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cflx-resolve