opensource-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes standard system utilities including
mkdir,ls, andcatfor local file management, and the GitHub CLI (gh) for repository operations. These operations are scoped to a local staging path and are triggered by explicit user commands. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: No unauthorized data transmission detected. Interaction with external services is limited to the official GitHub API and repository hosting via the
ghtool. These operations, such as creating a public repository and pushing code, are only performed after clear user confirmation steps. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is exposed to indirect prompt injection as it processes external project files. The assessment identified the following evidence chain:
- Ingestion points: Project source files are read from user-defined paths into the agent context via the
opensource-forkerandopensource-sanitizeragents. - Boundary markers: Variables are interpolated into sub-agent prompts (e.g.,
{SOURCE_PATH},{STAGING_PATH}) without specialized delimiters to segregate data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill maintains capabilities to execute shell commands and perform network operations via the GitHub CLI.
- Sanitization: A dedicated
opensource-sanitizersub-agent is implemented as a security gate, specifically instructed to scan for secrets, PII, and dangerous files before the pipeline proceeds.
- Ingestion points: Project source files are read from user-defined paths into the agent context via the
Audit Metadata