team-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
claude agentssystem command to dynamically discover agents installed via the CLI or marketplace. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it reads and executes the content of external markdown files as agent personas.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads files from
./agents/**/*.mdand the user's global configuration directory~/.claude/agents/**/*.mdas defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks protective boundary markers. It interpolates content into a subagent prompt using the template:
"{agent file content}\n\nTask: {task description}", which does not instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the file content. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Agent tool to spawn multiple subagents in parallel, providing them with the unvalidated content of the persona files.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the markdown file content before it is passed to the subagents.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accesses the
~/.claude/agents/directory. While this is the intended location for global agent personas, accessing hidden configuration directories in the home folder is a sensitive operation that could expose agent-specific configurations.
Audit Metadata