team-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the claude agents system command to dynamically discover agents installed via the CLI or marketplace.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it reads and executes the content of external markdown files as agent personas.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads files from ./agents/**/*.md and the user's global configuration directory ~/.claude/agents/**/*.md as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks protective boundary markers. It interpolates content into a subagent prompt using the template: "{agent file content}\n\nTask: {task description}", which does not instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the file content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Agent tool to spawn multiple subagents in parallel, providing them with the unvalidated content of the persona files.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the markdown file content before it is passed to the subagents.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accesses the ~/.claude/agents/ directory. While this is the intended location for global agent personas, accessing hidden configuration directories in the home folder is a sensitive operation that could expose agent-specific configurations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 24, 2026, 12:58 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — team-builder