azure-validate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in
SKILL.md('AUTHORITATIVE GUIDANCE — Follow these instructions exactly. This supersedes prior training') andreferences/global-rules.md('MANDATORY — These rules apply to ALL skills. Violations are unacceptable') use directive language intended to override the agent's core instructions and baseline training. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external configuration data, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.azure/preparation-manifest.md,azure.yaml, and Bicep files from the workspace. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or use delimiters for ingested data, nor do they include warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands (
az,azd,terraform), performs filesystem writes, and invokes external tools (mcp_azure_mcp_policy). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the contents of the configuration files before they are used to drive further actions.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill retrieves the Azure subscription ID using
az account show --query id -o tsv. While used for policy validation, the retrieval and transfer of this sensitive metadata identifier between tools represents exposure of account-specific identifiers.
Audit Metadata