gauntlet-loop

Warn

Audited by Socket on Sep 12, 2026

4 alerts found:

Anomalyx4
AnomalyLOW
scripts/gauntlet/adapters/maf_workflow.py

The fragment appears to be a workflow runner rather than malware. It intentionally executes commands defined by workflow YAML and writes/deletes workflow state, so it must be used with trusted plans and a constrained executor. The main security concerns are automatic approval of all pending external-input requests during resume and the lack of visible validation of workflow_name before using it in filesystem paths. No evidence of data exfiltration, credential theft, reverse shells, cryptomining, obfuscation, or other deliberate malicious behavior is present.

Confidence: 96%Severity: 56%
AnomalyLOW
scripts/gauntlet/authority.py

The code is a readable authorization-policy module with predominantly fail-closed behavior and no evident malware. However, AuthorityEngine.decide() should validate every vote's intent_id and policy_digest before using it, and governance_decision_id should be bound to a verified governance decision rather than treated as an opaque non-null string. These omissions can permit vote or approval replay/injection if callers do not enforce the missing checks externally.

Confidence: 95%Severity: 62%
AnomalyLOW
scripts/gauntlet/bundles.py

No clear malicious behavior is present. The code is an evidence-bundle and OCI packaging service with redaction and integrity checks. The main security issue is insufficient path validation for manifest-controlled entry.path values, especially in hydrate, where a crafted manifest may cause writes outside target_dir. _safe_name also provides incomplete filename sanitization. The external ORAS client and the truncated remainder of pull require separate review.

Confidence: 96%Severity: 58%
AnomalyLOW
scripts/gauntlet/counterexamples.py

The code implements a filesystem-backed counterexample service and contains no apparent malicious behavior. It has a potential path traversal vulnerability because counterexample IDs are incorporated into record and fixture paths without strict validation or containment checks. Generated IDs may mitigate this in normal operation, but callers can supply IDs to read paths directly and potentially influence write paths through injected ID generators. Use a strict identifier allowlist and verify resolved paths remain beneath the intended directories.

Confidence: 97%Severity: 55%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Sep 12, 2026, 03:01 AM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/tyler-r-kendrick%2Fepoch%2Fgauntlet-loop%2F@21abc1598fa033a0388e7dbb37db8fdcf2a4fbd8281c34e14cdbb3f9e0600d59