orchestrate-attractor-loops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to "remove... unrequested features or safety" during the implementation review phase. This pattern can be used to instruct sub-agents to bypass safety filters or remove security-critical defensive programming (e.g., bounds checking or input validation) if they are not explicitly mentioned in the original task requirements.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the processing of external data that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads "governing specifications," "repository instructions," and "user-level tasks" from the local environment or external input.
- Boundary markers: No boundary markers, delimiters, or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are utilized when passing these potentially untrusted specifications to sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
agentCLI to spawn sub-agents and performs "live validation," which involves the execution of the running software and inspection of workspace effects. It also involves writing design and review artifacts to the file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the external specifications or tasks before they are interpolated into prompts for the authoring or validation agents.
Audit Metadata