site-slides
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes several shell commands using dynamic placeholders based on user input or filesystem discovery. Evidence includes:
ls ./site/public/slides/<directory-name>pdf2jpg <filename>.pdfrm -f <filename>.pdf- These patterns are susceptible to command injection if the agent does not properly sanitize the directory or file names.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions to download and install external software at runtime if a dependency is missing. Evidence:
cargo install swiss-knifeis executed if thepdf2jpgcommand is not found. While crates.io is a standard registry, runtime installation of third-party tools increases the attack surface.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (images and PDF files) to "understand its content and generate appropriate captions," which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processed files located in
./site/public/slides/<directory-name>(Step 4 and Step 5). - Boundary markers: None (No instructions to ignore embedded text in images or PDFs).
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
ls,pdf2jpg,rm,cargo install) and file system modification (.mdxand.astrofile generation). - Sanitization: None (No validation or escaping of the content extracted from images).
Audit Metadata