q-presentations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-supplied content to generate slide outlines and image prompts, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-provided markdown content (e.g.,
source.md) enters the agent context during the analysis step. - Boundary markers: The
references/base-prompt.mdtemplate uses headers like## SLIDE CONTENTto separate instructions from data, but it lacks specific directives to the image model to ignore instructions potentially embedded within that user data. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
scripts/gen_slide.pyfor network-based API calls (OpenAI and Gemini) and filesystem writes, whilescripts/merge-to-pptx.tsandscripts/merge-to-pdf.tscreate local documents. - Sanitization: No evidence of content sanitization or filtering is present in the scripts before the source material is used in prompt generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves the execution of several internal scripts, including
gen_slide.py,overlay_logo.py, and Bun-based TypeScript scripts for merging slides into PPTX and PDF formats. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on third-party dependencies from standard registries, such as
openai,google-genai,Pillow,python-dotenv,pdf-lib, andpptxgenjs, which are installed viapipand managed vianpx.
Audit Metadata