skills/udecode/dotai/sync-pstack/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sync-pstack

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The cross.mjs helper script contains functionality to execute commands via the Codex CLI with the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag. This allows the agent to perform actions without standard security constraints or user confirmations when operating in its 'Codex worker' mode.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads AI session transcripts from ~/.claude/projects/ and ~/.codex/sessions/. These files contain a history of all user-AI conversations, which may include sensitive data or credentials. When combined with the network access enabled in the 'reach' mode of the cross.mjs script, this creates a high risk for data exfiltration.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell command execution via several helper scripts (proof.mjs, mutate.mjs, sync-pstack.mjs) to manage files, run tests, and interact with the local environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones and fetches content from an external repository (github.com/michael-denyer/pstack-claude) to sync plugin logic and read changelogs, which are then used to influence agent behavior.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Markdown instructions and Javascript scripts at runtime, saving them into the .agents/pstack/ directory and subsequently executing them via Node.js.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect injection as it parses external data such as GitHub changelogs and project rules to propose workflow modifications to the user and the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 05:16 PM