sync-pstack
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
cross.mjshelper script contains functionality to execute commands via the Codex CLI with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This allows the agent to perform actions without standard security constraints or user confirmations when operating in its 'Codex worker' mode. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads AI session transcripts from
~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions/. These files contain a history of all user-AI conversations, which may include sensitive data or credentials. When combined with the network access enabled in the 'reach' mode of thecross.mjsscript, this creates a high risk for data exfiltration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell command execution via several helper scripts (
proof.mjs,mutate.mjs,sync-pstack.mjs) to manage files, run tests, and interact with the local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones and fetches content from an external repository (
github.com/michael-denyer/pstack-claude) to sync plugin logic and read changelogs, which are then used to influence agent behavior. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Markdown instructions and Javascript scripts at runtime, saving them into the
.agents/pstack/directory and subsequently executing them via Node.js. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect injection as it parses external data such as GitHub changelogs and project rules to propose workflow modifications to the user and the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata