worktree-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive application data by reading from
~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude-code-sessionson macOS. This directory contains internal JSON files belonging to the Claude desktop application, which include session history, working directories, and task titles. While this is documented as the method for retrieving workspace labels, it involves reading from a private application data store. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses
execFileSyncto executegitcommands for worktree management andcodeto launch the VS Code application. These commands are directed by arguments provided to the skill, such as the--repopath. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The script reads Git commit subjects via
git logand session titles from the desktop application's internal JSON files. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to wrap this external content when it is processed or printed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the local disk and execute system commands (
git,code). - Sanitization: While commit subjects are truncated to 60 characters for display, there is no filtering or escaping of the content to prevent potential instruction injection if the agent later parses the script's output.
Audit Metadata