skills/udecode/plate/continue/Gen Agent Trust Hub

continue

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to make decisions based on untrusted data read from disk, creating an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in project files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads the user's current goal, active plan files (docs/plans/*.md), mutable state files, verification evidence, and architecture/research documents from .agents/** or the project's task directory.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or instruct the agent to ignore instructions found within these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent to execute a 'next move,' which typically involves shell command execution (subprocess.run), file writing, and network operations depending on the agent's broader toolset.
  • Sanitization: Absent. Data read from these files is used directly to determine the 'Verdict' (keep course, pivot, replan) and the 'Next move.'
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses computed paths to load and execute other skill files based on state variables.
  • The instructions specify that if current_pass_skill is missing, the agent should infer the path as .agents/skills/<current_pass>/SKILL.md and load that skill.
  • This dynamic loading mechanism allows the execution flow to be redirected to arbitrary local skill files based on the content of the current_pass variable in a state file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 02:14 PM