continue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to make decisions based on untrusted data read from disk, creating an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in project files.
- Ingestion points: Reads the user's current goal, active plan files (
docs/plans/*.md), mutable state files, verification evidence, and architecture/research documents from.agents/**or the project's task directory. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or instruct the agent to ignore instructions found within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill directs the agent to execute a 'next move,' which typically involves shell command execution (
subprocess.run), file writing, and network operations depending on the agent's broader toolset. - Sanitization: Absent. Data read from these files is used directly to determine the 'Verdict' (keep course, pivot, replan) and the 'Next move.'
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses computed paths to load and execute other skill files based on state variables.
- The instructions specify that if
current_pass_skillis missing, the agent should infer the path as.agents/skills/<current_pass>/SKILL.mdand load that skill. - This dynamic loading mechanism allows the execution flow to be redirected to arbitrary local skill files based on the content of the
current_passvariable in a state file.
Audit Metadata