wc-jp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the shell
startcommand on Windows to open the localwc-jp.htmlfile in the system's default browser. This is a functional requirement to display the generated vocabulary data in a rich user interface. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's HTML interface references external JavaScript libraries from well-known and trusted services, including Vue.js from unpkg.com and UnoCSS from jsDelivr.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The agent is directed to generate a JavaScript data structure (
window.__WC_DATA__) and write it to a local file (wc-jp-data.js). This file is then loaded as a script by the browser, representing a controlled form of dynamic data injection for the UI. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection, as user-provided vocabulary requests influence the content written to the data file and subsequently rendered in the browser.
- Ingestion points: User-provided Chinese words and quantity preferences (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified for the
ja_htmlorzhdata fields. - Capability inventory: File system writing and shell command execution (
start). - Sanitization: The skill utilizes Vue's
v-htmldirective to render content generated by the AI agent without explicit sanitization mechanisms.
Audit Metadata