uipath-automationhub
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to retrieve sensitive authentication information from the local file system at
~/.uipath/.auth. This file stores the user's UiPath cloud access tokens and session data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the external Automation Hub API, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved via endpoints such as
GET /automations/{id},GET /automations/{process_id}/documents, andGET /idea-schemaas documented inreferences/api-endpoints.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific boundary markers or provide explicit instructions for the agent to treat content from the API as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool (forcurlanduipCLI commands) and theReadtool, which could be exploited if malicious content is processed by the agent. - Sanitization: There are no requirements or steps provided to sanitize or validate the data fetched from the API before it is processed or presented to the user.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executeuipandcurlcommands, interpolating variables such as$ACCESS_TOKEN,$ORG,$TENANT, and$PROCESS_IDdirectly into the shell execution strings.
Audit Metadata