uipath-coded-apps
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to conceal agent actions and tool outputs from the user. For instance,
references/dashboards/CAPABILITY.mdstates, 'The user should see nothing between their request and the plan. No "Reading files…", no "Checking login…". Pure silence then the plan.' andreferences/dashboards/plugins/deploy/impl.mddirects that 'All other steps are silent — run commands, read outputs in context, never echo raw JSON or bash output to the user.' This PI_CONCEALMENT pattern reduces user oversight and could be used to mask unauthorized or malicious activities. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The debugging workflow in
references/debug.mdinstructs the agent to generate complex JavaScript files (reproduce.mjs,clear-state.mjs) that use the Playwright browser automation framework and execute them at runtime. Authoring and running automation scripts dynamically is a high-risk pattern as it executes code generated by the LLM with access to local and network resources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The dashboard build pipeline (
assets/scripts/dashboards/build-dashboard.mjsand related flows) usesexecSyncto run shell commands likenpm ci,npm install, andnpx tsc. It also involves moving agent-authored TypeScript modules into the project structure for compilation, which provides an execution path for agent-generated logic. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill automates administrative tasks in the UiPath cloud environment.
references/debug.mdencourages high autonomy ('Do everything you can with your tools. Only ask the user for things the agent physically cannot do'), andassets/scripts/dashboards/setup-admin-folder.mjsuses the CLI to automatically assign 'Folder Administrator' roles to groups, potentially granting elevated permissions without explicit step-by-step confirmation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill routinely downloads and installs numerous packages from the public npm registry (
registry.npmjs.org). While these packages originate from the trusted 'uipath' organization and standard libraries (e.g.,playwright,react-pdf,lucide-react), the runtime installation of dependencies is a significant attack surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface by ingesting natural language descriptions to generate application logic (
intent.json). - Ingestion points: Dashboard and metric descriptions in
CAPABILITY.mdandintent.json. - Boundary markers: The skill uses some structured choices for intent classification, but the core metric logic (
fnBody) is generated directly from user-influenced prompts. - Capability inventory: Includes file system writes, network requests via
fetchand SDK, package installation, and administrative CLI operations (uip admin). - Sanitization: There is schema validation for the structured
intent.jsonfile, but the logic within the agent-written metric modules remains unverified.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata