uipath-rpa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it is designed to ingest and process data from untrusted workflow files and project configurations.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and analyze
.xamland.csworkflow files, as well asproject.jsonand.metadatafiles, which may contain instructions from external sources. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including executing code (
uip rpa run), debugging (uip rpa debug start), and installing dependencies (uip rpa packages install), which could be leveraged if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or filtering instructions that might be embedded in the code comments or metadata of the processed files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill allows the AI agent to execute automation workflows on the local system using the
uip rpa runanduip rpa debug startcommands as detailed inreferences/cli-reference.md. This is a primary capability of the skill. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation includes activities and APIs capable of performing network requests, such as
NetHttpRequestinreferences/activity-docs/UiPath.Web.Activities/2.5/activities/NetHttpRequest.md. While these are intended for legitimate API integrations, they represent a potential vector for data exfiltration if the agent is directed to send sensitive data to an external endpoint.
Audit Metadata