doc-reader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to dynamically add new capabilities using
npx skills addfrom external URLs (e.g.,https://docs.example.com/skill.md). This allows for the acquisition and execution of remote skill definitions from untrusted documentation websites. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on fetching external resources via
curland platform-specific tools from arbitrary documentation sites. This includes fetchingllms.txt,llms-full.txt, and site-specific MCP server configurations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to execute shell commands such as
curlandnpxwith parameters derived from external URLs, which can be a vector for command injection if not handled securely by the underlying platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits signs of metadata poisoning by claiming to be authored by "Mintlify" in the file metadata, while the provided author context identifies the publisher as "ujang19".
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted data from external websites, creating a vulnerability to instructions embedded in third-party documentation.
- Ingestion points: External content fetched from documentation URLs via
curland web fetching tools (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched documentation are present.
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (
curl,grep), skill management (npx skills add), and MCP server integration. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, sanitization, or filtering of the content retrieved from remote documentation sites.
Audit Metadata