react-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches UI component configuration and styling from the vendor's registry at
https://r.assistant-ui.com/mcp-config.json. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation explicitly warns that the default storage implementation (
McpLocalStorage) persists authentication tokens in plain text within the browser's local storage, which is susceptible to XSS. It recommends usingMcpCustomStoragefor production use cases. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions suggest using
npx assistant-ui@latestfor project initialization, which executes code from a remote package in the local environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates connections to user-defined third-party MCP servers by URL, which creates a risk of data transmission to untrusted endpoints if a malicious server URL is provided by a user.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the integration of third-party tool outputs into the agent's runtime, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious MCP server could provide instructions designed to manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points: User-provided MCP server URLs and results from tools called via the MCP protocol.
- Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the provided documentation or implementation examples.
- Capability inventory: Support for
callTooland network requests viafetchin storage handlers. - Sanitization: The skill focuses on UI management; sanitization of tool outputs for prompt injection is not described.
Audit Metadata