runtime
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation in
references/local-runtime.mdprovides a code example for integrating OpenAI directly in the browser. It demonstrates usingprocess.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEYwithdangerouslyAllowBrowser: true. In modern web frameworks like Next.js, environment variables prefixed withNEXT_PUBLIC_are automatically included in the client-side JavaScript bundle, meaning the API key is publicly accessible to any user who visits the site. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents multiple pathways for sensitive data to leave the local environment, including sending conversation history to
/api/chat, uploading files to theassistant-ui Cloudservice, and transmitting voice data to providers such as ElevenLabs and LiveKit. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework supports the execution of
tool-callmessage parts as described inreferences/types.md. While intended for legitimate functionality, this mechanism allows the agent to execute code or operations based on potentially untrusted model output, which could be abused if the agent's instructions are manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture presents a surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: External data enters through
AttachmentAdapterfile contents andChatModelAdaptermodel responses. Boundary markers: The provided documentation examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands in untrusted data. Capability inventory: The runtime possesses capabilities to append/edit messages and executetool-callactions. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external attachment content is documented in the adapter implementation examples.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata