orca-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill contains an explicit instruction for the agent to seek higher privileges: 'If it fails with runtime_access_denied, your sandbox blocked the connection: re-run it with escalated permissions'. This encourages the agent to use commands like
sudoto bypass local environment restrictions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local binaries (
orca,orca-dev, ororca-ide) determined by environment variables likeORCA_CLI_COMMANDandORCA_DEV_REPO_ROOT. It warns about name collisions with system utilities (e.g., the GNOME Orca screen reader). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a 'discovery stub' pattern where it runs
ORCA skills get orca-clito fetch instructions from the output of a local command. This introduces an attack surface where the tool's output dynamically provides the primary instructions for the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Instructions are loaded via the output of the command
ORCA skills get orca-cliinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None provided; the agent is instructed to load and follow the version-matched guide directly.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates worktree management, terminal interaction, and browser control via the
orcaCLI. - Sanitization: There is no apparent sanitization or validation of the guide content retrieved from the executable.
Audit Metadata