adversarial-verify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted findings and reproduction commands.
- Ingestion points: Content enters the agent context through the
$claimargument and findings list paths (e.g., in SKILL.md Step 1), which are then passed to sub-agents as ground truth evidence. - Boundary markers: The verifier prompt template in references/verify-patterns.md uses simple text headers but lacks secure delimiters or explicit instructions to treat data as non-executable, increasing the risk of instruction confusion.
- Capability inventory: The skill grants verifier agents access to the Bash tool and explicitly instructs them to execute reproduction commands provided in the untrusted data (SKILL.md Step 3).
- Sanitization: No input validation, filtering, or escaping is performed on the content of the claims before they are processed by agents or executed as commands.
Audit Metadata