normalize-agent-for-claude
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted markdown data from user-provided agent files.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses the
Readtool to load the content ofAGENT.mdfiles specified by the user via the$targetargument. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" directives when interpolating the content of the target agent into the agent's context for analysis.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write and edit files (using
WriteandEdittools) based on its analysis of the untrusted input, specifically creating plan files in the.ulpi/plans/agents/directory and modifying the sourceAGENT.mdfile. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation, escaping, or filtering to prevent malicious instructions embedded in a target agent file from influencing the normalization process.
Audit Metadata