review-crate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is explicitly instructed in Step 2 to run
cargo test -p <crate-name> -- --nocaptureon a directory provided via the$crate_pathargument. Rust'scargotool automatically compiles and executes code from the target directory, includingbuild.rsscripts and test functions. If the target crate is malicious, this results in arbitrary code execution within the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a high-exposure data ingestion pattern.
- Ingestion points: In Step 1, the agent is directed to "Read every file in the crate," including source files,
Cargo.toml, and local documentation likeCLAUDE.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack any requirement to use delimiters or to treat the file content as untrusted data that should not be interpreted as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, andEdittools, allowing it to execute system commands and modify the local filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content of the files before they are processed by the LLM, leaving the agent vulnerable to instructions embedded within the code or comments of the audited crate.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
Bashtool to perform system-level operations such as running the Rust compiler and test runner. This capability, combined with the processing of untrusted crate paths, increases the risk of command injection or malicious execution if the crate name or path contains shell metacharacters that are not properly handled.
Audit Metadata