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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses aggressive instructional language to override the AI agent's standard operating procedures and safety guidelines. It defines a 'MANDATORY FIRST RESPONSE PROTOCOL' and uses forceful phrases such as 'ABSOLUTELY MUST,' 'not negotiable,' and 'not optional' to compel the agent to prioritize these instructions over its internal logic and previously defined constraints.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an automated discovery mechanism that scans the file system for other skill definitions (
.claude/skills/*/SKILL.md) using theGlobtool and reads their content, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Discovery Process) andreferences/discovery.mdutilizeGlobandReadto ingest content from arbitrary local skill files.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing these discovered files.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to invoke discovered skills via the
Skilltool, delegate tasks to sub-agents via theTasktool, and modify project configuration files via theEdittool (specificallyCLAUDE.md).\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the content of the discovered skill files before the agent is instructed to follow them.
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