ask-codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to manually construct and execute a shell command using the
codexCLI tool. - Evidence: Step 4 provides a template:
codex exec ${CODEX_MODEL:+--model=$CODEX_MODEL} --sandbox read-only -c model_reasoning_effort="xhigh" -c stream_idle_timeout_ms=600000 "prompt here" < /dev/null. - Risk: If the strings interpolated into the prompt are not correctly escaped, it creates a vector for shell command injection.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly directs the external analysis tool to read and obey instructions from project configuration files that may be untrusted.
- Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.md,CLAUDE.local.md,.claude/rules/, and~/.claude/CLAUDE.md(via Step 3's memory-load preamble). - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions simply tell Codex to "read these project guidance files."
- Capability inventory: The
codex execcommand (Bash tool) with full project read access. - Sanitization: Absent; file content is processed as instructions.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to transmit project context to an external service provider.
- Evidence: The workflow involves gathering "relevant files, error messages, behavior observed" and sending them to the
codexCLI, which communicates with OpenAI's API. - Risk: Sensitive code or internal project structure could be exposed to the third-party service.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation encourages the installation of an external third-party package.
- Evidence: The Troubleshooting section specifies:
npm install -g @openai/codex.
Audit Metadata