new
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests pull request titles, merge request titles, and commit messages to generate release notes, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data is fetched from GitHub, GitLab, and Gitea via
gh,glab, andteaCLI tools, as well as local git logs, inscripts/get-notes.sh. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a human-in-the-loop checkpoint in Step 8 and Step 9 of
SKILL.md, requiring explicit user confirmation via theAskUserQuestiontool before proceeding with publication. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to modify the local filesystem (updatingCHANGELOG.md), commit changes to the repository, and publish releases to remote platforms (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Data is parsed using
jqand prefixes are stripped usingsedinscripts/get-notes.sh, but no content-based sanitization or filtering of the injected strings is performed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool for core logic, including git operations, semantic version calculation, and interaction with platform CLIs. While variables like"$notes"and"$new_version"are shell-quoted to mitigate command injection, the execution of these tools constitutes a significant capability within the agent's environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch PR/MR metadata and push releases to external platforms (GitHub, GitLab, and Gitea) using their official command-line interfaces.
Audit Metadata