pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub Pull Request descriptions, comments, and repository files, which are then passed to a subagent for analysis. This creates a surface where a malicious PR could provide instructions that influence the subagent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Pull Request and Issue data fetched via
gh pr viewandgh issue view, and changed files read from the worktree in Phase 2.2. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompt uses structural headers but lacks specific instructions to disregard instructions embedded in the data.
- Capability inventory: Access to shell commands, file system writes in /tmp/, and network operations via the
ghCLI. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping of the ingested data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the subagent to execute project-specific test and linting commands such as
npm testandpyteston the code provided in the Pull Request. A malicious contributor could manipulate these commands by modifying the project's configuration files (e.g.,package.jsonscripts), leading to the execution of arbitrary code when the tests are run. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches Pull Request metadata and repository code from GitHub's official services using the GitHub CLI (
gh) andgit.
Audit Metadata