social-listening
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external social media platforms (X, LinkedIn, Instagram, and YouTube), which represents a large surface area for untrusted input.
- Ingestion points: Public posts, replies, comments, and profile data fetched via the
socialcommand line tool as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to treat the fetched data as purely informative and ignore potential commands embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
bashtool, which is a high-privilege capability that could be misused if an indirect injection is successful. - Sanitization: There are no explicit sanitization or filtering steps mentioned for the fetched JSON data before it is presented to the LLM for summarization.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for users to install external plugins and connect to a remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) server.
- Evidence: Mentions connecting to
https://mcp.hedwigai.com/and installing the plugin/plugin marketplace add un-seen/hedwigai-skills. These resources are owned by the skill's vendor and are part of the intended setup process.
Audit Metadata