us-importers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes US customs shipment records (bills of lading) which contain free-text product descriptions provided by external filers. This data is ingested into the agent's context, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if a filer includes malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Output from the
tradecommand-line tool executed via thebashtool (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters (e.g., XML tags or Markdown blocks) or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the shipment data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
bashtool for command execution and thecreate_workbooktool for automated research (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the text returned from the
tradesearch before it is processed by the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use a
bashtool to interact with thetradeutility and check for available programs viaprograms list. While this is intended functionality for a research agent, shell access represents a broad capability that requires careful monitoring.
Audit Metadata