ibbs-pro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from the external forum
ibbs.pro, which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through results from the
ibbs_pro__get_searchandibbs_pro__read_pagetools described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or include warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the forum content.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes powerful tools for browser automation (
unbrowse.browse.act), task execution (unbrowse.run), and general scraping, which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved forum content is mentioned, allowing raw external data to be interpolated into the agent's prompt.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes requests to the vendor's infrastructure to fetch configurations and execute tools.
- Evidence: The skill fetches OpenAPI specifications and MCP configurations from
https://unbrowse.ai/api/...andhttps://unbrowse.ai/mcp/...as seen inREADME.mdandserver.json. These represent standard vendor-to-platform communication. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides standard installation commands for the agent environment.
- Evidence:
README.mdprovidesclaude mcp addandnpx skills addcommands to integrate the skill and its remote MCP server.
Audit Metadata